CONFERENCE – Towards a sustainable bio-based society; Amsterdam, Netherlands

A special invitation to attend the kick-off inaugural conference of the series Towards a sustainable bio-based society: Aligning scientific and societal agendas for Bio-Innovation!

*Until 18 October special Early Bird Discount!*

When: December 6 And 7, 2012
Where: Netherlands, Amsterdam, Pakhuis de Zwijger
Theme: Bio-based innovation and its ethical, social and political aspects
Conference flyer:

The transition towards a sustainable bio-based society is one of the big global challenges of today. Collaboration between science, industry, policy and civil society is of the utmost importance to make it happen. The conference series Towards a sustainable bio-based society intends to contribute to this. We hereby cordially invite you to attend the inaugural meeting of the series, scheduled for December 6 and 7 2012 in Amsterdam. The transnational, interdisciplinary conference series is organised under the auspices of the European Science Foundation (ESF) and  supported and co-funded by CSG (Centre for Society and the Life Sciences, The Netherlands), the ESRC Genomics Network (EGN, United Kingdom) and the FFG funding agency GEN-AU (Austria). We are confident that you will find the conference a rewarding experience that will allow you to contribute to setting the agenda towards a sustainable, bio-based future.

The overall aims of the conference series are to:
o    identify key trends in the co-evolution of contemporary bio-societies on the one hand and life science research on the other
o    explore the opportunities, challenges and concerns for society at large arising from these trends
o    develop a roadmap towards a sustainable bio-based economy through the alignment of scientific and societal agendas.

Each conference in this five conference series will be devoted to a specific topic concerning the societal dimensions of emerging bio-technosciences. The inaugural conference, to which we are now inviting you, is intended to will offer a preliminary survey of the landscape to be mapped. It will include parallel discussion sessions and poster presentations by early-stage researchers as well as invited keynote presentations.
There is an early bird registration discount available until October 18. Deadline for registration is November 26.

CONFERENCE REPORT – 2nd Annual Joint Meeting on Environmental Philosophy (May 31-June 3, 2005)

Submitted by Amy Knisley, Colby-Sawyer College

The University of North Texas joined the ISEE and the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) to sponsor this second comprehensive forum for environmental philosophers, May 31-June 3 in Allenspark, Colorado. For the program and papers, go to: The conference began with Holmes Rolston asking whether virtue-based environmental ethics was more like half a loaf (better than none) or half a horse (worse), ended with debates about the aesthetic quality of nature’s disorderly tendencies (tornadoes anyone?), and in between explored issues ranging from the usefulness of Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysics for environmental philosophy to alternative myths and metaphors for property rights and how environmental philosophy might make use of them. And interlaced with the theoretical and metatheoretical inquiry was reflection on environmental philosophy itself—its past, present and future.

Gene Hargrove, in the second evening’s plenary session on environmental philosophy and public policy, recalled that in the early days of the journal Environmental Ethics doing “applied” rather than “pure” philosophy was generally considered a tenure risk. Articles by philosophers often dealt heavily with the history of philosophy, and many articles in the journal were written by activists rather than academics. Ensuing decades have seen an explosion of environmental philosophy’s academic literature, conferences and curricular presence, strengths which Dale Jamieson (President, ISEE) highlighted in his comments. The glass is nonetheless only half (perhaps as much as two-thirds) full according to Jamieson, and environmental philosophy suffers from several significant weaknesses. One is its fragmentation, both geographic and philosophic. This conference, jointly sponsored by the two predominant organizations for environmental philosophy in North America, was developed in part as a response to that fragmentation. Jamieson also noted a lack of generally accepted standards for being a well-trained environmental philosopher, which he thinks is associated with another central concern: environmental philosophy’s “voluntary marginalization” from mainstream philosophy. We tend to publish in and read a small circle of journals, which has tended to insulate us from mainstream philosophy and erode our standards of scholarship. Among other remedies, Jamieson urged programs specializing in environmental philosophy to ground their curricula in philosophy’s core traditions, and urged the assembled to read and write for more mainstream journals in addition to our “own” journals.

Jamieson’s recommendation that we cultivate disciplinary credibility was complemented by Robert Frodeman’s (Director of Interdisciplinary Activities, IAEP) focus, in his comments, on the need for a theory of interdisciplinarity and for active engagement with public policy as critical to the future of environmental philosophy—a future about which he feels some urgency. The contraction of another academic discipline, geology, in the wake of an inability on the part of its proponents and practitioners to translate it effectively to the public, provided the backdrop for Frodeman’s recommendations to environmental philosophy. Environmental philosophy needs to make a “policy turn” according to Frodeman, informed by interdisciplinary thinking, communicated through accessible language, and unencumbered by the false dichotomy between theory and application. We need to include internships in our environmental philosophy curricula, and to replace the “philosopher king” with a “philosopher bureaucrat” who can work with policy makers as a problem-solving peer, rather than an agenda-setting theoretician. Frodeman’s own scholarly work, liberally sprinkled with National Science Foundation-funded projects to integrate the work of philosophy, such as values analysis, with the work of public policy, such as prioritizing uses of parks, is a good model of the philosopherbureaucrat at work. One might expect that as chair of Philosophy and Religious Studies at UNT, which is about to roll out a new PhD in Philosophy, he will advocate for internships and other curricular innovations in keeping with his prescription for our field.

This session crystallized questions that arose in variant forms throughout this engaging, well-organized 4-night, 3-day conference. Do philosophical debates about personhood influence law and policy concerning treatment of animals? Should they? Can effective dialog with the current exponents of the “Wise Use” view of public lands be facilitated by studying and responding their understanding of property rights? Do philosophers have anything important and, moreover, persuasive to say about the difference between human dams and beaver dams, and whether either should be included in wilderness? Will environmental ethics grounded in the ideas and rhetoric of virtue have a stronger foothold with public land managers contemplating ecological restoration in wilderness, than arguments from intrinsic value? Besides each other, who should we be writing for and talking to? Should academic philosophy “subordinate” its efforts to the concerns and aims of public policy? Is environmental philosophy rising to the occasion of the profound and momentous questions it considers? I attended all 11 sessions of the conference as well as their informal continuations at the Aspen Lodge after hours, and have arrived at this preliminary summation: this conference is vital to future of the field, that future about which Frodeman is anxious. It is vital in several ways. First, it refreshes our minds about what have become environmental philosophy’s core theoretical questions, encouraging us to take them up again and more effectively. Second, the conference organizers have committed to the participation of graduate students, and so are seeding the field’s future. Third, the conference invites a perception of environmental philosophy as “problematized,” that is, as less cohesive than it might appear and less effective than it might like to believe. This demands engagement, not only with the questions and theories raised in the sessions, but also with the academic, ecologic and public contexts from which those questions have emerged. The kind of formal and informal work accomplished at this joint meeting, in both its first and second years, has encouraged me about the future of our field. Look for announcements of next year’s conference in this newsletter’s spring edition.

CONFERENCE REPORT – On Values in Nature (May 2, 2005)

Submitted by Christopher Schlottmann, New York University

On May 2, 2005, Princeton’s Center for Human Values, together with the Princeton Environmental Institute, and Council of the Humanities, sponsored a workshop entitled “Values in Nature: The Role of Ethics in Environmental Policy.” It was a gathering of remarkably impressive and competent thinkers, whose expertise spanned the fields of environmental ethics, environmental aesthetics , environmental literature, environmental policy, environmental history, and environmental sciences, in addition to a number of participants whose specialty falls outside of the traditional environmental community. This latter quality made it especially stimulating, and the conversations were open-minded and oriented towards practical policies, all while maintaining a high level of theoretical discussion.

Having celebrities present always stimulates conversation. The final panel, “When Values Conflict,” was overshadowed by environmentalism’s newest movers and shakers, Michael Shellenberger and Tod Nordhaus. Skepticism and praise for their “Death of Environmentalism” paper dominated the Q&A session. Obviously, an entire conference could be devoted to their debates. The only downside was that the papers of other panel members – Michael Toman, Michael MacCracken, Stephen Gardiner – tackled the ethical dimensions of environmental policy quite directly and rigorously, yet failed to enter the conversation.

Shellenberger and Nordhaus’s premise is that environmentalists have “framed” their cause incorrectly. People don’t respond well to this: “If the frame and the facts conflict, people often reject the facts.” Therefore, environmentalists should frame their cause within the American mythology of aspiration. Of course, environmentalism’s failings cannot be solved by simply advertising differently, but reframing might be the best strategy to achieve political goals.

Selling the idea of a “frame” also seems to entail committing to one, and the conversation remained narrowly focused. Important questions that deserved serious answers were left hanging: Why not appeal to American’s sense of fairness instead of aspiration? Is marketing an environmental policy prudent and ethical, or should we instead work on educating for informed decision-making? Does it matter if the myth of aspiration doesn’t apply to most Americans?

Too much of a good conversation is of course a good thing, but the “Death of Environmentalism” paper is only one of many ideas currently making its rounds that should incite reflection. Gardiner’s caution about the remarkable ethical challenges of GCC – a “perfect storm” of the convergence of the 3 problems of: global scale (incl. dispersion of agency, inadequate institutional scales), temporal scale (including intergenerational ethics), and theoretical concerns (incl. scientific uncertainty, potential persons, non-human animals) – seems like a much more daunting long-term challenge than how to “sell” environmentalism. Determining what our obstacles are, and what moral aims we have, is at least as important as how to get people to behave in accordance with those aims (assuming that this latter goal isn’t morally problematic itself). Environmental ethics is not a justification for present environmentalism, and keeping the purposes of each distinct would help to establish the best environmental policies. Both the ethics community and Shellenberger and Nordhaus want to reform how we determine environmental policy goals, but seem to use distinct means. Are we even aiming at the right goal? If so, are we using the proper means that will ensure long-term sustainability? This is the conversation that we should be having. Further, educators and political theorists should have a vitally important voice in this dialog.  Their voice might replace the urgent goal of winning a policy or election with the longterm project of encouraging democratic engagement and critical thinking. Even better, perhaps a reconciliation of these two goals is possible.

Grist’s extensive series on “The Death of Environmentalism ” is available at: